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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
VIRGINIA REES, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 8619 
GEORGE ARCHIBALD, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts giving rise to this action and to the prosecution 
of this appeal are as follows: 
Respondent is assignee of an account incurred at Madi-
son Memorial Hospital in Rexburg, Idaho, as a result of in-
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jury sustained by Keith Archibald in an automobile accident. 
Keith is the minor son of appeallant whose custody was 
awarded to Keith's mother Eva Archibald on Jan. 4, 1946 
under a decree of divorce entered in the State of Idaho in 
the case of Eva Archibald vs. George Archibald, which 
decree made no provision for support to be furnished by 
appellant (R 18). 
At the tim·e of the accident Keith being 16 years of 
age was, without the knowledge or consent of appellant, 
taken to Madison Memorial Hospital, (R 6) whereupon ap· 
pellant was called to the hospital and was requested by 
personnel at the hospital to assum·e the obligation of Keith's 
being cared for by the hospital which appeallant refused to 
do ( R 4). Keith had not been adopted by another prior 
to the accident ( R 5). The decree of divorce entered in said 
action by which custody of Keith was awarded to his mother 
was never modified or amended (R 7). 
Counsel for appellant and respondent stipulated to 
the evidence in the case ( R 4, 5, 6, 7) . 
The trial court entered judgment against appellant in 
the full amount of the claim, being the sum of $1372.42 
principal, $144.35 interest and $13.20 costs, for a total sum 
of $·1529.97 (R 14). 
II. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
( 1 ) The court erred in finding that the son received 
reasonable and necessary medical care, and that no part 
of the charges had been paid. 
( 2) The court erred in finding that the care and 
services rendered to the son of defendant (appellant) were 
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necessary for the preservation of the life and health of the 
son. 
( 3) The court erred in denying appellant's motion 
for dismissal. 




It appears that this case is one of first im1pression in this 
state. 
Point I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SO~ 
RECEIVED REASONABLE AND NECESSARY MEDICAL 
CARE, AND THAT NO PART OF THE CHARGES HAD 
BEEN PAID. 
There is no evidence supporting this finding. Appel-
lant through counsel stipulated that the boy was hospitalized 
at Madison Memorial Hospital as a result of an automobile 
accident, that he received the medication claimed and that 
the charges were reasonable for the area ( R 4), but the stipu-
lation went no further. There is no evidence to the effect 
that the services were necessary to the extent that it is claimed 
they were rendered. Nor is there evidence showing that no 
part of the charges had been paid. By this argument appel-
lant does not ignore the facts as stipulated to for appellant 
did not stipulate that medication was necessary to the extent 
it is claimed it was rendered. The burden of proof was on 
respondent as to these matters particularly inasmuch as ap-
pellant denied the allegations of the complaint paragraph 2 
alleging the indebtedness owing by appellant and further 
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alleging that the services and medication were necessary for 
the benefit of said minor child (R 1, 2). 
In 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 135, page 138, Evidence we find 
the following statement of the law: 
"The fundamental principle is that the burden 
of proof in any cause rests upon the party who, as de-
termined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, as-
serts the affirmative of an issue and remains there until 
the termination of the action." 
foot note 14 to this section cites Wood v Auburn 87 
Me. 287, 32 A. 906, 29 L.R.A. 376 holding that he 
who asserts something to be due him, not he who denies 
a debt, has the burden of judicial action and proof. 
Appellant does not here contend that he claims he had 
paid on the account, his position is that the mother being 
primarily responsible, having received custody of the boy 
under the decree of divorce, was first obligated to pay, and 
no showing was made as to whether any demand had been 
made upon the mother or whether the mother had paid on the 
account. This was, as is appellant's position, pre-requisite 
to any claim or right of action against appellant. 
As to the nature of the services rendered by the hospital 
after appellant had refused to guarantee payment of the 
account, the account record reflects the fact that the 
boy remained in the hospital far in excess of two 
months. Under the circumstances appellant was in no posi-
tion to consult with representatives of the hospital as to the 
need or necessity for medication and hospitalization to the 
extent claimed to have been rendered, the fact is the hospital 
was in practically the position of having a blank check signed 
by appellant, provided appellant were to be held on this ac-
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count. Nor is there any showing that the mother was consulted 
as to necessity for the services performed and the expenses 
incurred. Appellant is mindful of the fact that emergency 
services come within the implied authority rule, but there 
is no such showing in this case and if there were the extent of 
the services for the length of time charged could not be 
claimed under that rule of law. There is no legal presumption 
in this case that the services rendered to the extent and in the 
amount charged were necessary, the presumption of accept-
ance of benefits does not here apply where one other than he 
who receives the care is called upon to pay for such services. 
Point 2. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CARE 
AND SERVICES RENDERED TO THE SON OF APPEL-
LANT WERE NECESSARY FOR THE PRESERVATION 
OF THE LIFE AND HEALTH OF THE SON. 
The argument contained in our brief under point l also 
applies to point 2. This case might be very different had 
respondent offered evidence supporting such a finding but 
there is not a word of evidence to support this finding. Ap-
pellant did not stipulate to such evidence nor was appellant 
requested to so stipulate. It appears that the whole question 
as to whether appellant can be held liable or whether ap-
pellant cannot be held liable for the debt rests on such a 
finding, but the finding must be supported by the evidence. 
Of course appellant would not have stipulated to evidence 
which would have supported this finding, otherwise appel-
lant might have had no defense to the action. Then too, ap-
pellant would be entitled to know whether all or what part 
of the services rende:red were claimed to be necessary for the 
' 
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preservation of the life and health of the son. The record 
is wholly deplete of evidence showing the necessity fer keep-
ing the boy in the hospital for over two months time. 
Appellant is m\indful of the law and authorities which, 
under ordinary circumstances, make a father liable for the 
necessaries of life furnished his children even though the 
father is deprived of their custody by a decree of divorce. 
The evidence in this case does not bring us within the rule 
laid down by such authorities. Even under those cases de-
cided in jurisdictions which have been called upon to decide 
cases where necessaries are involved without question as to 
whether the claim is or is not for necessaries of life, we find 
courts holding that an independent action cannot be brought 
against the father. Such a decision is handed dmvn by the 
courts of Michigan. 
In Judson v Judson, 171 lVIich. 185, 137 N.W. 103 
wherein the court held that a mother '"·ho obtained a decree 
of divorce in another state awarding the custody of a child 
to her, without providing for their support or for alimony, 
cannot maintain a suit in equity in Michigan to compel the 
father to make provision for the future support of herself and 
the child. 
In 20 ALR page 827 we find the following: 
"In Burritt v Burritt ( 1859) 29 Barb. N.Y. 124, 
denying recovery in an action by the mother against the 
father for the support of an infant child whose custody 
had been a warded to the m(other by a decree of divorce 
in another state, which made no provision for the support 
of the child, the court said that the award of the care 
and custody of the child to the mother must be pre· 
sumed to carry with it the obligation to support, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary; or, at least, to 
, 
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relieve the father from the obligation to furnish such 
support upon the call of the mother; and that to make 
the father liable in such case there must be special cir-
cumstances averred in the complaint or appearing in 
the evidence, from which the obligation must arise or 
may be reasonably inferred." (Italics ours) 
Point 3. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL. 
Upon the conclusion of the stipulation of counsel for 
respondent and appellant and upon respondent resting, ap-
pellant moved for a dismissal on the grounds of lack of 
evidence to prove respondent's case. Appellant pointed out 
to the court the failure on the part of respondent to show 
that the mother of the child who was awarded custody had 
failed and refused to pay the claim or that she had made 
payment thereon and that demand for payment had first been 
made upon her. Appellant was entitled to know whether 
demand had been made upon the mother for payment and 
whether if demand had been made the mother had failed and 
refused to pay the account, or whether the mother had made 
some payment on the account. 
In Harris v Harris, 5 Kan. 46 it was held that when a 
woman is divorced from her husband, the latter is not exclu-
sively liable for the support of their children. The duty is 
as much the mother as the father. 
Appellant's motion to dismiss also pointed out the fact 
that there was no modification of the decree of divorce. 
There was no showing that there was no other source, except 
through the father, for the payment of said account, no prop-
erty real or personal from which payment mlight be had. 
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In Dodge v Keller (1927) 29 Ohio App 114, 162 NE 
750, Annotated 7 ALR2d at page 494 we find the following: 
"It was ruled that a divorced father was not liable 
to an undertaker for the burial expenses of his minor 
child, the undertaker having been engaged by the mother 
without the father's request or subsequent promise to 
pay for his services, where the divorce decree required 
the father to pay $1,000 in stated instalments, for the 
support of the child, whose custody had been awarded 
the mother' and the father was faithfully performing 
this obligation at the time the child died. The court 
indicated however, that the proper rem'edy for the 
mother would be for her to go into the court which had 
rendered the divorce decree, and ask for a modification 
of the same." 
It appears that the courts of New York have followed 
this same principal requiring a modification of the decree of 
divorce in the case of Gellert v Gellert, 219 App Div 737, 
219 NYS 820 and in Simon v Simon, 170 Mise 420 10 
NYS2d 577. 
Point 4. 
THE COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST APPELLANT. 
We are mindful of the fact that it appears from the ma-
jority rule from other jurisdictions involYing the question of 
support for minor children in a case of divorce between par-
ents where the decree makes no provision for support on the 
part of the father and complete custody is awarded to the 
mother, the father is not relieved from support. "\Ve have no 
quarrel with such cases, but "·e contend the instant case is 
not such a case. None of the cases so far as we have been 
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able to find and they appear to be few in numJber are predi-
cated on facts similar to those of the instant case. Here we 
have the hospital running up a very sizeable account after the 
father of the boy had advised its agents that he would not be 
responsible for payment and then asking the court to hold that 
the whole of this account comes within what is generally 
designated common necessaries of life. 
A distinction might be made in those cases where a child 
whose custody has been awarded to the mother under a 
divorce decree, becomes ill or becomes in need of dental care 
or requires the common necessaries of life, and a case such 
as we have here where the father having been deprived of 
custody and the society of the boy, has no control whatsoever 
over the boy who is permitted by the mother who is awarded 
custody and control to place himself in a position which re· 
suits in injury to the boy. The father in this case cannot 
and should not be held under a guise of such care being within 
those cases requiring the father to provide common neces-
saries of life. 
Of course medical care and hospital care under certain 
conditions are necessaries of life but when the father has no 
control over the instrumentality which brings about the con· 
dition requiring such care, then we say it comes within an 
exception to the general rule. 
Now let us examine the account on which the claim is 
based. It is evident therefrom that the boy was hospitalized 
from November 18th, 1954 to Feb. 23, 1955 a period of in 
excess of two months. How much of that time was actually 
necessary for the boy to reilljain at the hospital? Had the 
mother not expected the father to pay the bill would she 
not have taken the boy to her home and nursed him there? 
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Or had the boy been under the custody of the father might the 
father not have taken the boy to his home and nursed him 
there. This fact is forcefully evident from the charges for 
surgery as reflected by the account, once on Nov. 18, 1954 
the day of entry and once on Jan. 14, 1955 when it appears 
a cast was furnished. At any rate a part of the time of con-
valescing might have been at home and not at the hospital. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent having failed to show that the services 
rendered were necessary for the preservation of the life and 
health of the son, that no source of payment other than from 
the appellant was available, that demand had been made on 
the mother of the boy and that the mother had failed and 
refused to pay the account, the judgment sould be reversed. 
Wherefore appellant prays that the judgment entered 
herein be vacated and that appellant have judgment for his 
costs including costs of this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Milton V. Backman of 
Backman, Backman & Clark, 
Attorneys for defendant and appellant. 
Received copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
this ...... day of February, 1957. 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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